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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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
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DEPARIMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION (ARS)
APO San Francisco 96307

AVIH-AOPN

1 5 FEB 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Air Reconnaissance Support) for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR65 (RI) (U)

Communiting General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN VHGC-DST
APO 96375

1. (C) Section 1. Operations-Significant Activities:

- a. The 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Air Reconnaissance Support) and its five lettered detachments are organized under TOE 30-5D, 30-6D, 30-6D, 30-7D, MTOE 30-5D, MTOE 30-6D and MTOE 30-7D USARPAC 1/67, and USARPAC General Order Number 780, 27 November 1908. USARPAC General Order 780, 27 November 1968, established Detachment E (formally the 45th Military Intelligence Detachment (ARS)). The 45th Military Intelligence Detachment (ARS) assigned to this Battalion by USARV General Order Number 6292, 6 December 1967, and organized under TOE 30-7D, MTOE 30-7D USCONARC 1/68 and USARPAC General Order Number 44, 23 January 1968 was inactivated by USARPAC General Order Number 588, 1 October 1968, effective 15 October 1968. The present organizational structure of the 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Air Reconnaissance Support) is indicated by inclosure 1.
- b. The Battalion was engaged in providing combat support to MACV, MACV subordinate commands, ARVN tactical forces and other Free World Forces deployed in the Republic of Vietnam during the entire reporting period, a total of 92 days. Training was conducted on 26 days during the reporting period.
- c. The following changes in command occurred during the reporting period:
- (1) Captain John H. Tate, II, assumed command of Detachment B from Captain Jay Johnson on 24 December 1968.
- (2) Major Daniel E. Battles assumed command of Detachment E from Major Gerald D. Carroll on 24 January 1969.

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- d. The following key personnel changes occurred during the reporting period:
- (1) 1st Lieutenant Gary L. Laabs assumed the position of Battalion S4 from Captain Norman P. Bruneau on 19 November 1968.
- (2) Major Benjamin L. Munoz assumed the position of Battalion Executed Officer from Major Phillip G. Ware on 5 January 1969.
- (3) Major Robert H. Crittenden assumed the position of Battalion S2/3 from Major Benjamin I. Munoz on 5 January 1969.
- (4) Command Sergeant Major Orville R. Blue assumed the position of Battalion Sergeant Major on 21 January 1969 from Command Sergeant Major Royce W. Bradshaw who departed 11 December 1968.
- e. During the reporting period, the MTOE submitted to Headquarters USARV on 5 October 1968, (Ref: para le of ORLL dated 15 Nov 68) was withdrawn and resubmitted on 7 January 1969. Significant deletions were made as follows:
- (1) The Air Reconnaissance Liaison personnel were maintained within the detachment organization as in TOE 30-7D. Their current operational assignments were implemented by attaching these personnel to Headquarters Company rather than through MTOE action.
- (2) Two of the nine additional tton trucks requested in the MTOE submitted 5 October were deleted. (Ref: para le7 of ORLL dated 15 Nov 68.) Request for seven additional tton trucks is still in effect.
- f. The primary mission of providing tactical interpretation, reproduction and aerial delivery of imagery and related materials resulting from tactical air reconnaissance operations within the Republic of Vietnam was successfully accomplished during the reporting period. Support has been rendered to Army of Vietnam (ARVN), Republic of Corea Forces (RUKF), Australian, New Zealand and Thai units as well as to U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine elements throughout the four Corps Tactical Zones. Significant operational statistics and illustrative examples of the numerous types of regular

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and special support provided by the 1st MI Bn (ARS) to requesting units are presented below:

(1) 1st MI Bn (ARS) Detachments:

Nr of targets interpreted:	5,577
Nr of frames interpreted:	,367,110
Nr of II Reports:	5,784
Nr of new items reported:	5,492
Nr of mosaics constructed:	12
Ft of photo paper processed:	651,962
Nr of aerial sorties:	1,303
Pounds of cargo hauled on aerial deliveries:	101,880
Passengers transported on official business:	516
Requests for reproduction of photography completed	1,490

(2) Operations of the Headquarters Imagery Interpretation Section remained fully integrated with those of the Photo Processing and Interpretation Facility (PPIF) of the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW) at Tan Son Nhut. Immediate Photo Interpretation Reports (IPIR's) are produced by this joint section on selected imagery resulting from reconnaissance missions flown by aircraft of the 460th (TRW). The types of imagery interpreted include photo, infrared, and Side Looking Airborne Radar (SIAR). Immediate reports include items of military activity in response to the requestor's Essential Elements of Information or items of a significant nature which could have an immediate effect on friendly operations. A Hot Report of particularly significant findings is made immediately by telephone to the intelligence officer of the command primarily concerned. The subsequent Immediate Reports are transmitted via IMMEDIATE precedence teletype message and routed through the MACV Command Operations Center dedicated net to the appropriate Field Force or Corps headquarters. The Headquarters Imagery Interpretation Section, working in conjuction with the PPIF, handled the following amount of imagery during the reporting period:

Nr of targets interpreted:	5,249
Nr of II Reports:	4,037
Nr of items reported:	2,886

(3) 1st MI Bn (ARS) personnel were provided to other units upon request to provide instruction in hand-held camera and 35mm film

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processing techniques, to aid in familiarization with the aerial reconnaissance system and to accomplish hand-held camera missions. Hand-held photography (35mm) was acquired, processed, and disseminated by 1st MI Bn (ARS) in support of numerous requesting units the milliout the four Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) for operational plane targeting, attempted confirmation/denial of interrogation and reports, and other intelligence purposes.

The Battalion continued to present courses of instruction to assist personnel who are assigned to various field units to better accomplish their duties in the aerial surveillance and reconnaissance effort in the Republic of Vietnam, to shorten the "break-in" period of all newly arrived Imagery Interpreters and to acquaint personnel who perform G2/3 Air duties with the aerial surveillance and reconnaissance system in Vietnam. The regularly scheduled In-country Imagery Interpretation Course (III-C) and the G2 Air Course continued to be favorably received by those personnel attending. The 1st MI Bn (ARS) is augmented by instructors from Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam; the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, 7th U.S. Air Force; J2 Air Reconnaissance Section MACV; and Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV). Instructors from out-of-house are utilized to present specific, specialized blocks of instruction. The remainder of support to the school is from in-house assets. The Imagery Interpretation Course acquaints newly arrived Imagery Interpreters with the unique interpretation features of the Republic of Vietnam, while the G2 Air Course provides a basic working knowledge of the Aerial Reconnaissance System as it is organized and functions in Vietnam. The 1st MI Bn (ARS) School fills an important gap in transitioning newly arrived personnel into proficient area-oriented techicians in the shortest possible time. The quota arrangement established for the III-C and G2 Air Course by Headquarters USARV for Army units has greatly facilitated the scheduling of courses. In addition, this quota system increases the degree of the commanders' awareness of the facilities available for the training of his personnel. During the reporting period three classes of the In-country Imagery Interpretation Course were conducted with a total of 27 students attending. The G2 Air Orientation Course was conducted two times with a total of 29 students attending.

h. Upon the arrival of the new ES-38B photographic Darkroom Group in Vietnam, three classes were scheduled by this Battalion in conjunction with Technical Representatives from Pax Corporation

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and ECOM, USARV. Each course was of five days duration and was designed to familiarize photo lab personnel with the operation of the new equipment, problem areas and maintenance. During the reporting period two classes were presented with a total of 19 at a in attenuace. One class is currently scheduled for an February 1969.

- i. During the reporting period, Detachment D, providing general support throughout II Corps Tactical Zone, established a course of instruction in Nha Trang to train personnel from supported units in the proper utilization of the 35mm hand-held camera. One class was held with 12 students attending. Additional classes are scheduled. It is believed that through these classes, a more responsive, useful hand-held program will be developed in support of ground commanders.
- j. During the reporting period, this unit was tasked by MACV J2 to assist the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), Office of the Secretary of Defense, in the test and evaluation of the Tech/OPS Color (TOC) system. This TOC system is an improved version of the Black-and white-to Color system which was evaluated by this unit as part of Project CESARO. Minor adjustments and modifications have been accomplished on the equipment. The test and evaluation is designed to determine the application and value of the system. A test plan has been established and initial tests with the equipment have been conducted. Minor adjustment and repair problems have been experienced within the camera lens and viewer to date.
- k. During the period, Detachment D continued to increase efficiency in producing its monthly Master Cover Trace. The 64th Engineer Detachment (Terrain) has made available a new "cronaflex" map master. With this system, the detachment places the information on a special overprinted a cetate map and an ozalid reproduction process is utilized to produce the cover trace. The result is a more usable product in the form of a map sheet for the tactical commander.
- l. During the reporting period, Detachment C continued to produce new target folders and to update old target folders as requested by the G2 Advisor, IV Corps. The Detachment was tasked with providing sample target folders for the Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance Committee at Fort Holabird, Maryland. This will benefit the personnel attending the school by providing excellent

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examples of the interlinence product gained from the Hand-held Aerial Camera Program.

- m. The Battalion continued its civic action program through donati s of food, clothing, toys, construction materials and final assistance to several Vietnamese orphanages. Some 15,000 pour supplies for the impoverished up Vap Orphanage in the north suburbs of Daigon were distributed. Detachment E provided 3,400 rounds of canned goods and other food items to the 181 children of the Nuoc Ngot Orphanage in Hue.
- 2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluation and Recommendations.
 - a. Personnel. None.
 - b. Operations.
- (1) Use of Imagery interpreters to perform Hand-held aerial camera missions.
- (a) Observation: Better results are obtained when Imagery Interpreters are utilized in lieu of Reproduction personnel in support of the Hand-held Aerial Camera Program.
- (b) Evaluation: Imagery Interpreters have received formal training in the techniques of recognizing and identifying enemy installations, assembly areas, weapons positions, vehicles, and other indicators of enemy presence in an area from an aerial prospective. The Imagery Interpreters are also better qualified to locate and plot the activity on a map, and to correlate this information to the photography and write the necessary IPIk upon returning to the ground. The Imagery Interpreter who flew the mission knows exactly why the mission was flown, where it was flown, and what results were achieved without relying upon another person's information. Reproduction personnel are generally better qualified in the operation of the hand-held camera, but it has been proven under operational conditions that the Imagery Interpreter can become proficient in the use of the camera with only a short period of training.
- (c) Recommendation: That selected Imagery Interpreters of placed on flight status and be used to the fullest extent in support of the Hand-held Aerial Camera Program.

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- (2) Use of Asahi Pentax camera for the Hand-held Aerial Camera Program.
- (a) Observation: Field units that have been issued the Asahi Pentax camera with a built in light meter in support of the Handham are able to obtain much better photography than units that the been issued the Nikon F camera.
- (t) Evaluation: Personnel can be readily trained in the use of the Abahi Pentax camera with through-the-lens light meter and are able to obtain excellent results. This has been demonstrated by comparing the photographs of those units that are equipped with the Asahi Pentax against those which are equipped with the Nikon F. The probability of the photographer misjudging the degree of light available in order to determine the correct exposure setting is decreased when using a through-the-lens light meter. The chances of obtaining under or over exposed negatives are greatly diminished when the Asahi Pentax camera is used.
- (c) Recommendation: That field units be issued the Asahi
 Pentax camera in support of their hand-held program and that those
 units presently equipped with Nikon F cameras be issued the Asahi
 Pentax camera when their present camera is returned for repairs.
- (3) Reporting procedures for Supplementary Photo Interpretation Reports (SUPIR's):
- (a) Observation: Time is wasted in the preparation and dissemination of electrically transmitted negative reports.
- (b) Evaluation: In the past the II Section submitted individual reports, negative as well as positive, on all missions received and interpreted. An informal survey of supported units indicated that these negative reports were of no value to anyone but the particular requestor of that mission. As a result individual reports were prepared only on all positive findings and sent to normal addressees. All negative reports were consolidated and held until the end of the day. These negative reports were then electrically transmitted only to the originator of the request. Even after consolidating all these reports and waiting until the end of the day to transmit them, the Detachments are able to get the reports out within twelve hours. To further streamline reporting procedures, this unit is attempting to establish an Address Indicator Group (AIG). This would permit transmittal of all reports at electrical speeds. Back-up hard copies would be sent to those requestors who desire them. It is estimated that report preparation and transmission preparation time would be

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cut by 40 - 50%. The time required for the last requestor to receive his report should be cut to hours instead of a figure which sometimes extends to two weeks.

- Recommendation: That reporting procedures be streamlined within the detachments by consolidating negative reports and by establishing AlG's.
 - (1,) Use of Kodak Type 1717 Waterproof Paper.
- (a) Observation: The success of the Hand-held Aerial Camera Program is dictated by the ability of the detachments to provide a finished product to the requestor in a minimum amount of time.
- (b) Evaluation: Detachment A used the Kodak type 1717 water-proof Paper in the processing of hand-held prints. This paper provided excellent results with a fixing time of three (3) minutes and a wash time of five (5) minutes. It is possible to print and dry a twenty exposure roll of processed film in less than one hour. This paper is developed in a standard developer, such as Doktel. Another major advantage with the Kodak type 1717 waterproof Paper is its capability to be air dried. This characteristic allows the Imagery Interpreter to handle the print in as little as five minutes from the time of processing. A non-gloss finish is desired when using this type paper.
- (c) Recommendation: That the Kodak type 1717 Waterproof Paper be employed in the Hand-held Program to achieve the desired quick response time essential to the program.
 - (5) The EH-29B processor paper take-up.
- (a) Observation: The EH-29B processing machines in the new ES-38B portable darkroom group developed a problem in the paper take-up; the paper slides from side to side causing creases and tears.
- (b) Evaluation: By drilling out the bottom of the latches and centering them with the processor head latches, the head and body are held tighter. This allows less play for the paper and insures a straight travel as the reel will pull the paper and move with it (ref: TM 11-6740-278-12, p. 147).

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- (c) Recommendation: That this method be adopted by other users of the ES-38B if they observe similar problems.
 - (6) ES-38B Portable Darkroom Group.

observation: when the old ES-38A was removed, the floor had rotted out due to the action of chemicals which had not properly drained.

- (b) Evaluation: When the new ES-38B was installed, it was raised off the ground and a 2" slope added from rear to front insuring a slope towards the drainhole so that all chemicals would flow out. Any standing chemical under the ES-38B should evaporate due to the air space.
- (c) Recommendation: That this method be considered by all users of the ES-38B to protect the shelter from chemical deterioration.

c. Training.

- (1) Formal Aerial Observer Training for Hand-held Photographers.
- (a) Observation: Hand-held cameramen have been called upon in several recent instances to adjust artillery and naval gunfire, and to direct Tactical Air strikes against targets of opportunity while conducting their hand-held missions. Attempts by this Battalion to place aerial photographers in an aerial observers course in-country have been unsuccessful to date.
- (b) Evaluation: Due to the emphasis which is being placed on the Hand-held Aerial Camera Program, and the ever increasing confidence commanders have in the program, photographers from this unit are being employed on missions over areas in which operations are presently in progress, or where the likelihood of drawing enemy fire is highly probable. In three recent instances, cameramen have been requested to adjust fire upon targets of opportunity in their target area, or against enemy forces directly threatening friendly ground troops. Our cameramen have been unable to perform this task due to lack of training in that field.
- (c) Recommendation: That an aerial observer/forward controller type training course be established in-country to enhance the

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effectiveness of the Hand-held Aerial amera Program in support of all tactical elements.

(2) Reproduction facility for tactical units utilizing handheld rameras.

Observation: Since hand-held equipment is available to tact: units, many units desire to build and operate their own reproduction facility.

- (b) Evaluation: This unit has learned that tactical units are not always fully aware of the requirements necessary to establish such a facility. Initially, the units must be made fully aware of the requirements for a reproduction facility, water supplies and special equipment. Training and assistance can only be accomplished if these requirements are fulfilled. A team of reproduction and imagery interpretation personnel can then be effectively utilized to offer instruction and assistance. The team should spend several days with the supported unit to establish an effective operation. Upon departure, contact should be maintained and the supported unit should forward examples of their product to the detachment for evaluation.
- (c) Recommendation: That all units offering assistance and training insure that the tactical units are aware of the requirements before a program is initiated and that assistance and follow-up be maintained to develop effective programs in all units.

d. Intelligence.

- (1) Intelligence support afforded to HVNAF personnel.
- (a) Observation: Intelligence support to the RVNAF personnel was inadequate and should be improved.
- (b) Evaluation: During the reporting period, it became apparent that many of the RVNAF intelligence personnel were not fully aware of the intelligence support that was available through this Battalion and other aerial infomation producing units. During commanders visits to U.S. advisory elements and talks with RVNAF intelligence personnel it was found that hVNAF personnel were often unaware of much of the support available (such as interpretation, processing and dissemination of intelligence information) from aerial reconnaissance missions flown by the Free World Military Assistance

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Forces and or, anic Army aviation.

(c) Recommendation: That all U.S. Intelligence and advisory personnel make a concentrated effort to establish liaison with RVNAF personnel and keep them informed of all aerial reconnaissance su. . available and the various purposes for which it could be utilized.

e Logistics.

- (1) Vehicle maintenance.
- (a) Observation: The detachment's vehicles were better maintained by satelliting the vehicles on an established motor pool.
- (b) Evaluation: During the reporting period. Detachment D had the opportunity to observe and evaluate the maintenance support arrangement that was concluded with the HHC Motor Pool, IFFV. Under this agreement Detachment D agreed to assign one mechanic, MOS 63B20, with tools, to HHC motor pool to work on the Detachment's vehicles under supervision of the HHC motor sergeant, IFFV, and also combined the Detachemt's PLL with that of HHC, IFFV. (If the agreement should be terminated, the Detachment would receive a proportionate share of the PLL.) In return, IFFV agreed to provide motor pool facilities for maintenance of the Detachment's vehicles, provide supervision for 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance services, dispatch the Detachment's vehicles and make proper entries in the log books. Implicit in this agreement is the provision that the Detachment's vehicles can be fuelled at the IFFV motor pool which is at least two miles closer than the other authorized gas station near the Detachment's Headquarters. This arrangement proved satisfactory and is expected to remain in force through the next reporting period.
- (c). Recommendation: That units establish maintenance arrangements that are best suited to their operational environment.
 - (2) Lack of required supplies and equipment.
- (a) Observation: The procuring of major end items, fast turnover expendable supplies, and repair parts was a problem during the reporting period.

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- (b) Evaluation: Incorrect supply procedures and asset reporting caused critically required items to be non-available within the supply system. Asset reporting of major items of equipment, e.g. vehicles and generators, had not been accomplished on a timely basis. Consequently, the in-country inventory of major equipment was exaltered and replacements were not forthcoming. The lack of report in a titems caused organizations to perform uneconomical repair using repair parts stock, and depriving the system of repair parts derived from cannibalization, as well as slowing the flow of new equipment assets to NN. Additionally, fast turn-over expendable supplies, especially photographic expendables, were provided in large quantities when this command was deployed. Supply economy did not allow requisitions to be submitted until the initial stockage was nearly depleted. The supply system was not capable of responding in the time frame required because no stockage levels had been established.
- (c) Recommendation: That command emphasis be placed at all levels, to include the AGI and CMI, insuring timely asset reporting, monitoring of requisitioning precedures and return of excesses to the supply system.
 - f. Organization. None.
 - g. Other. None.

l Incl

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2-ACofS, G2, Eighth U.S. Army
2-ACofS, G2, USA Support, Thailand
1-CO, 525th MI Gp
2-CO, 460th TRW
2-CO, 2nd MI Bn (ARS)

JAMES M. MYERS
LTC, MI
Commanding

2-CO, 15th MI Bn (ARS)
2-Commandant, USAINTS
2-CO, USAIIC
2-CO, USACDCINTA
2-Commandant, USARPAC Intel School
1-CO, Det A, 1st MI Bn (ARS)
1-CO, Det B, 1st MI Bn (ARS)
1-CO, Det C, 1st MI Bn (ARS)
1-CO, Det D, 1st MI Bn (ARS)
1-CO, Det E, 1st MI Bn (ARS)

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AVMICE-DUT (15 Feb 69) 1st Ind

DURJECT: Operational Report of 1st Eilitary Intelligence Dattalion
(Air Reconnaissance Support) for Period Ending 31 January
1969, ACS OSFOR-65 (E1) (U)

THAD CUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARRY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 7 MAR 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTL: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This head warters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Readquarters, 1st Filtery Intelligence Battalion (AB).

2. Comments follow:

- hand held aerial camera missions, page 6, paragraph 2b(1). Concur with recommendation that selected imagery interpreters be placed on flight status whenever possible, and be used in support of the hand held aerial, camera program. The use of imagery interpreters as aerial photographers enhances the production of intelligence since they are intimately aware of the photographic requirements necessary for a detailed analysis of the resulting photography. The unit is presently integrating imagery interpreters into the hand held camera program.
- b. Teference item concerning use of Asahi Pentax Cameras for the Hand-held Camera Program, page 7, paragraph 2b(2). Concur in observation and evaluation that the Pentax camera is more desireable than the Mikon F camera for use in the program. Purchase and issue to field units is dependent upon availability of funds through II channels; the unit has been so advised.
- c. Reference item concerning reporting procedures for Supplementary Photo Interpretation Reports (SUPIR's), page 7, paragraph 2b(3); nonconcur. As prescribed in MACV Directive 95-11, all requests for aerial reconnaissance from subordinate units are channeled through the responsible Field Force or Corps G2 Air. The unit has been advised that the desired streamlining of reporting procedures is satisfactory as long as the Field Force or Corps G2 Air is sent an information copy of negative reports.
- d. Reference item concerning use of Kodak Type 1717 Waterproof paper, page 8, paragraph 2b(4); concur in recommendation. All units involved in the Hand-held Camera Program have been notified that the paper is available through normal supply channels and were advised of the FSH.

AVHGC-DST (15 Feb 69) 1st Ind

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e. Reference item concerning the EH-29D processor paper take-up, page 8, paragraph 2b(5); concur in recommendation. The USALCOM FLD will notify all users of the EH-29D of the field expedient to prevent creases and tears.

- f. Reference item concerning 12-380 Portable Darkroom Group, page 9, paragraph 2b(6); concur in recommendation. The USAECON ELE will advise all users of this equipment of the field expedient as well as a recommendation to remove the rubber floor mat every other day to enable spilled chemicals and normal condensation to evaporate.
- g. Reference item concerning formal aerial observer training for Handheld Photographers, page 9, paragraph 2c(1); nonconcur. The use of herial photographers to adjust artillery fire is restricted to those emergency situations where no artillery observer is operating in the area. The unit has been advised that when the situation requires one of its aerial photographers to adjust artillery fire, the firing unit will "talk" him through the mission. The establishment of a USANV level school is impractical due to the differences in areas of operations, rules of engagement, clearance procedures and methods of operation throughout Vietnam.

FOR THE COMMANDEL:

C. D. WILSON

1LT AGC
OIC AG CLASSIFIED

Cy furn: lst l.I Bn GPOP-DT (15 Feb 69) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st MI Bn for Period Ending
31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 25 MAR 1969

TO: Assistent Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

- 1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report, as indorsed, except as indicated below.
- 2. Reference item concerning operations, page 6, paragraph 2b(1), nonconcur. The use of an imagery interpreter to perform handheld photographic mission is a direct misuse of highly trained personnel. The criticality of the mission and the worldwide shortage of II's demands that they be utilized only in the role for which they have been trained. The Imagery Interpretation School at Ft Holabird is 19 weeks in length and is now working a double shift to place qualified interpreters in the field. The serial observation program is not a mission of Military Intelligence Battalion (ARS). If the serial observation program is a valid requirement for MIBARS, then the TOE should be modified and a training program established to provide personnel and equipment as provided for in AR 95-51 and FM 1-80. If this program is approved, there will undoubtedly be increased demands for personnel already in short supply. In addition, circumstances would dictate that the added missions would draw the most proficient II's away from their primary mission.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


G. E. HOLEYFIELD

MAJ, AGC Asst AG

Cy furn: CG USARV

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION (ARS)
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

ORGANIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT OF 1ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION (ARS) OPERATING WITHIN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM



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